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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF LITIGATION:
COMPENSATION NEUROSIS, MALINGERING,
PTSD, SECONDARY TRAUMATIZATION, AND
OTHER LESSONS FROM MAS
Edward J. Hickling, Edward B. Blanchard, & Matthew T. Hickling*
INTRODUCTION
According to the U.S. Department of Transportation,1 nearly two
percent of the U.S. population will have a motor vehicle accident
(MVA) each year, and the majority of American men and women will
have had a car crash by the age of thirty. The National Highway Traf-
fic Safety Administration reported that there were approximately
41,800 MVA-related fatalities and 3.2 million personal injuries in
2000.2 The overall cost of MVAs, when one considers lost work, medi-
cal care, and the impact on an individual's life, is in the tens of billions
of dollars each year.
A trauma can be any painful experience, either physical or emo-
tional, that can pose a threat of injury or death to oneself or to others.
The Albany Motor Vehicle Accident Project at the Center for Stress
and Anxiety Disorders began studying the psychological impact of
motor vehicle accidents in the late 1980s and early 1990s. We have
continued those studies to the present day. One major focus of those
studies was to learn about one particular traumatic reaction-post-
traumatic stress disorder that (PTSD)-which, at the time of the ini-
tial study, was not thought to occur following MVAs. This reflected
the thinking in the late 1980s that to meet diagnostic criterion for
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1. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS 2000: A COMPILATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH DATA FROM THE FATALITY ANALY-
SIS REPORTING SYSTEM AND THE GENERAL ESTIMATES SYSTEM (2002).
2. Id. at 85.
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posttraumatic stress disorder, one needed to experience a trauma that
was outside of the range of usual experience. 3 By definition, since
most people experience an MVA in their lifetime, MVAs were not
considered sufficiently outside the range of usual experience to war-
rant this diagnosis. Yet the patients seen in clinical psychology prac-
tice presented with symptoms of anxiety and posttraumatic stress
disorder that appeared very similar to the patients that shared similar
diagnoses seen in a Veterans Administration (VA) Hospital.
Subsequently, we began to study car crash victims, believing that
the trauma provided an unending supply of recently traumatized vic-
tims from whom we could learn how people deal with the trauma.
Wars and natural disasters, in contrast, provide far fewer opportuni-
ties. Car crash victims also seemed easier to talk to than rape or as-
sault victims, especially if we were not going to treat them, but just
follow them to assess change over a prospective, longitudinal period
of time. We were ultimately awarded our first National Institute of
Mental Health (NIMH) grant to study and follow the psychological
course of people who had been in car crashes.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ALBANY MOTOR VEHICLE
ACCIDENT PROJECT
This Part describes the PTSD study we undertook to explore
MVAs. First, we explain the mechanics of our assessment studies and
explain some of our subsequent findings. Next, we discuss the treat-
ment studies we ran and explain some of those findings.
A. Assessment Studies
Over a five-year period we were able to study 158 car crash victims
and assess what the impact of the accident was on the victims' psycho-
logical functioning for up to two years after each victim's accident.4
We also assessed, as a comparison group, ninety-three individuals who
had not been in an accident. The study examined participants in an
MVA within the past one to four months who sought medical atten-
tion for an injury sustained in the MVA (in our effort to rule out small
fender-bender accidents). 5 We performed extensive, state of the art
assessments for PTSD and other psychological reactions and we fol-
3. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISOR-
DERS (3d ed., rev. 1987).
4. See EDWARD B. BLANCHARD & EDWARD J. HICKLING, AFTER THE CRASH: ASSESSMENT
AND TREATMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT SURVIVORS (2d ed. 2004).
5. The state of the art in psychiatric assessment is structured interviews of demonstrated relia-
bility and validity, used by trained, doctoral-level mental health professionals. We used the Cli-
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lowed these people at six-month intervals for up to two years from the
time of their MVA. We found that of the MVA survivors in our study,
a surprisingly large number-about forty percent-had developed
PTSD. This population of MVA survivors was also investigated inter-
nationally. Perhaps the largest sample comes out of Oxford, England,
where Ehlers' group found that around twenty-three percent of car
crash victims in this sample developed PTSD.6 Our best estimate, for
all samples, is that one can anticipate that around twenty-five percent
of the population of injured car crash victims will develop this
disorder.
1. What About Other Disorders?
We and others have found a high incidence of comorbid diagnoses
in this group, with over fifty-six percent developing a mood disorder
(depression), while over ninety percent will develop anxiety that im-
pacts their driving.7
2. What Happens Over Time to These People?
In our research, we found that about forty-eight percent will show
an improvement in symptoms by six months so they no longer meet
diagnosis for PTSD, and by one year about sixty-five percent will
show improvement.8 After that, our data shows that without interven-
tion, there are very few people who will improve any further.9 Other
studies have shown that for as long as six years, even with treatment,
over forty percent of the victims will remain symptomatic.10 Clini-
cally, we have seen patients decades later who still show ongoing
problems. These findings raised two questions, discussed below.
nician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) and Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-R
(SCID).
6. See Anke Ehlers et al., Psychological Predictors of Chronic Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
After Motor Vehicle Accidents, 107 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 508 (1998). Twenty-three percent
represents the percentage of study participants who had developed PTSD after three months.
Id. The number drops to 16.5% after one year. Id. See also R.A. Mayou et al., Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder After Car Accidents: 3 Year Follow Up of a Prospective Longitudinal Study, 40
BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 665 (2002). After three years, the incidence of PTSD was eleven
percent. Id.
7. Edward B. Blanchard et al., One-Year Prospective Follow-Up of Motor Vehicle Accident
Victims, 34 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 775 (1996).
8. See BLANCHARD & HICKLING, supra note 4.
9. Id.
10. See id.
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3. Who Develops PTSD?
We found that there are several factors that lead to a good predic-
tion of who seems most at risk for PTSD. These factors are: previous
major depression, fear of dying in the accident, and extent of the in-
jury. Another powerful variable, discussed further below, is the pres-
ence of ongoing litigation. Other predictive variables, in our studies
and others, have included the occurrence of dissociative symptoms,
reoccurring symptoms, strong avoidance, prior diagnosis of PTSD,
gender (females more likely), responsibility,11 and the occurrence of
fatalities. 12
4. Who Gets Better Over Time?
We could predict improvement in a fair number of MVA victims if
we had certain information. Such information included: the degree of
physical improvement, whether the individual was depressed at the
time of the original assessment, whether there was pre-MVA history
of psychiatric treatments, the degree of vulnerability felt at the time of
the MVA, and the amount of family support.13
B. Treatment Studies
As clinical psychologists, once we learned about the possible conse-
quences of car crashes, we wanted to treat and help these people. We
were able to win additional NIMH support for a series of treatment
studies that ran from 1995 to 2000. The details for this are recorded
elsewhere 14 and summarized in our book,1 5 but the broad strokes are
set forth below.
We entered ninety-eight people into treatment, seventy-eight of
whom completed the program of care. The treatment program in-
volved either a ten-week cognitive behavioral intervention (CBT), a
ten-week supportive psychotherapy treatment, or a control (no treat-
ment) comparison group.16 Ultimately, CBT proved to be the most
effective treatment, with over seventy-six percent of those treated
11. See Edward J. Hickling et al., Effects of Attribution of Responsibility for Motor Vehicle
Accidents on Severity of PTSD Symptoms, Ways of Coping, and Recovery Over Six Months, 12 J.
TRAUMATIC STRESS 345 (1999).
12. See Edward B. Blanchard et al., Who Develops PTSD From Motor Vehicle Accidents?, 34
BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 1, 8 (1996).
13. See BLANCHARD & HICKLING, supra note 4.
14. See Edward B. Blanchard et al., A Controlled Evaluation of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
for Posttraumatic Stress in Motor Vehicle Accident Survivors, 41 BEHAV. RES. & THERAPY 79
(2003).
15. See BLANCHARD & HICKLING, supra note 4.
16. For elaboration on the various treatment programs, see Blanchard et al., supra note 14.
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with CBT showing an improvement in diagnostic status. Those placed
in supportive treatments showed a forty-seven percent improvement.
About twenty-four percent of those who were only assessed and put
on a waiting list showed improvement. Both of the treatment groups
fared better than the no treatment group. Improvement held up over
time, with little decrease in the CBT group and gradual improvement
in the supportive psychotherapy condition. Thus, while we concluded
we had one of the most successful treatments to date, a fair number of
individuals still had lingering symptoms that required additional care.
Overall though, we were pleased with the outcome of our
intervention.
We have continued to look at treatments-how much and what type
of treatments will be effective-and now have several ongoing self-
help studies. Self-help studies made sense to us given the limited
number of psychologists that are trained and using empirically sup-
ported treatments and given the sheer number of MVA victims. In
addition to a self-help book,17 we have an online treatment program
in place.18 Both are subject to ongoing empirical treatment studies.
Those results regarding effectiveness of these interventions are still
not known.
This is the background that led to the following area of interest-
the psychological effect of litigation. We found that a fair number of
our subjects were involved in litigation, and this variable turned out to
be one of our better predictors of continuing problems following
MVAs.
III. LITIGATION AND PTSD IN CAR CRASH VICTIMS
A. The Myth of Accident-Compensation Neurosis and Miller
This section begins with a brief overview of some of the more im-
portant literature. It has been widely believed that litigation and set-
tlement play a large role in the natural history of psychological
symptoms and disability among accident victims. Conventional wis-
dom suggests that individuals continue to have symptomatic com-
plaints until a suit settles, ostensibly to enhance the chances of
collecting a large settlement. Further, conventional wisdom also sug-
gests that once the suit settles, one should expect to see a dramatic
improvement, especially in psychological symptoms.
17. See EDWARD J. HICKLING & EDWARD B. BLANCHARD, OVERCOMING THE TRAUMA OF
YOUR MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT: A COGNITIVE BEHAVIORAL TREATMENT PROGRAM (forth-
coming 2006).
18. See After the Crash, www.afterthecrash.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Research traces this notion to 1961, and a paper presented by the
eminent British neurologist Henry Miller.1 9 The paper, "Accident
Neurosis," presented data on fifty accident victims-thirty-one indus-
trial accidents and nineteen traffic accidents-and followed victims for
two to four years after settlement of each victim's compensation suit.20
Miller found evidence of "gross psychoneurosis" when the partici-
pants were examined before settlement, including an "unshakable
conviction [on the part of the patient] of unfitness for work" and "an
absolute refusal to admit any degree of symptomatic improvement. '21
Predisposition to neurosis was supposedly evident in only fifteen of
the fifty cases. When these patients were examined after settlement,
forty-one of the forty-five working participants had returned to work;
only two had received psychiatric treatment for their symptoms.
These findings led Miller to conclude that the cause of accident neu-
rosis was not the result of physical injury. Rather, the neurosis arises
when (a) someone else is at fault for the accident, and (b) the accident
"has occurred in circumstances where the payment of financial com-
pensation is potentially involved. '22 Miller stated unequivocally that
accident neurosis was "not a result of the accident but a concomitant
of the compensation situation and a manifestation of the hope of fi-
nancial gain."' 23 This condition is not encountered when this hope
does not exist or where it has been finally satisfied or dissipated. 24
B. Almost All Subsequent Studies Have Failed to Support
Miller's View 25
First, Mendelson's 1981 study26 evaluated 101 accident victims, find-
ing that after their compensation claims had been settled, thirty-five
resumed work prior to settlement,27 while forty-four of the remaining
sixty-six had not returned to work even after the settlement. 28
19. The paper was presented at an invited address and was subsequently published in the
British Medical Journal. Henry Miller, Accident Neurosis, 1 BRrr. MED. J. 919, 919-25, 992-98
(1961).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 922.
22. Id. at 992.
23. Id. at 994.
24. Id.
25. While not an exhaustive review for today's purposes, interested readers are referred to
our 2004 book. BLANCHARD & HICKLING, supra note 4.
26. See George Mendelson, Persistent Work Disability Following Settlement of Compensation
Claims, 55 LAW INST. J. 342, 344 (1981).
27. Id.
28. See id.
622 [Vol. 55:617
2006] THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF LITIGATION 623
Second, this study followed an earlier finding2 9 of a similar pattern
in a study of 500 accident victims with "accident neurosis." That study
found that the effects of the financial settlement on the course of the
illness had a negligible benefit. 30
Third, Tarsh and Royston studied thirty-five of fifty patients who
had been assessed on medico-legal referral because of gross somatic
symptoms for which no adequate physical basis could be established. 31
The average time from injury to settlement was five years. 32 Two pa-
tients never left work, two others returned to work before the settle-
ment. After the settlement, four more returned to work and four
others returned to light duty. 33 The majority, over two-thirds, never
returned to work. 34
In a fourth study, more recently, Mayou and colleagues collected
follow-up data on 171 of 200 MVA victims. 35 The team addressed the
role of litigation and compensation among MVA victims. At a three-
year follow up, they compared ninety-six individuals who had filed
claims to seventy-five who had not.36 They found no differences be-
tween the groups in psychological distress and concluded that overall,
there was no evidence that there were significant differences in any
aspect of outcome between those who sought compensation and those
who did not.37 They further stated that there were no evident differ-
ences between those who settled early and those who settled late. But
the team also noted that information (on individuals who settled after
one year but before the third year) suggested that the subjects did
report some improvement at this follow-up point compared to those
who had not settled. 38
Fifth, in a six-year follow up of Mayou's Oxford sample, Bryant,
Mayou, and Lloyd-Bostock obtained data on eighty-one of ninety-six
29. See George N. Thompson, Post-traumatic Psychoneurosis-A Statistical Survey, 121 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1043 (1965).
30. See id.
31. Michael J. Tarsh & Claire Royston, A Follow-up Study of Accident Neurosis, 146 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 18 (1985).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See Richard Mayou et al., Psychiatric Consequences of Road Traffic Accidents, 307 BRIT.
MED. J. 647, 648 (1993); Richard Mayou, Medico-Legal Aspects of Road Traffic Accidents, 39 J.
PSYCHOSOMATIC RES. 789 (1995); Richard A. Mayou, Psychiatric Consequences of Motor Vehicle
Accidents, 25 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF N. AM. 27 (2002).
36. See Mayou et al., supra note 6.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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individuals who filed cases one year post-MVA. 39 Five of the cases
had not settled and seven had been dropped, leaving sixty-nine cases
that had settled. The researchers found whiplash cases settled earlier
(eighty-two percent by three years) than the other, more severe injury
cases (forty-three percent by three years). 40 The median award for
the severe injury cases was about £10,000 (about $16,000 at the time)
and about half that for whiplash. 41 Many of those involved were frus-
trated and angry over the slowness of the process and the modest size
of the awards.42 Many endured considerable financial hardship during
the litigation.
Again, contrary to Miller's assertion, the study showed no dramatic
improvements in physical symptoms, mental state, or social function-
ing once the case settled. 43 Instead, the authors noted the continued
anger and frustration of participants, which often increased because of
disappointing settlements. 44
Lastly, Bryant and Harvey45 investigated the role of litigation and
compensation in an Australian sample of MVA survivors who had
been hospitalized because of their injuries. Of the 171 patients ini-
tially assessed, they were able to reassess 106 at two years.46 Of these,
ninety-three initiated litigation within the first six months, whereas
thirteen did not.47 Of the ninety-three, twenty settled within two
years. 48
Comparisons across the three groups-nonlitigants, settled litigants,
and nonsettled litigants at two years-showed no significant differ-
ences on any demographic, injury variables, or psychological distress
at any time across assessments. Those who sought compensation did
not differ statistically from those who did not seek compensation, and
those who settled were no different than those whose cases were still
pending. Litigants (nonsettled plus those who settled) versus nonliti-
gants had higher percentages of acute stress disorder initially, 49 and
39. Bridget Bryant et al., Compensation Claims Following Road Accidents: A Six Year Follow-
up Study, 37 MED. Sci. & L. 326, 328 (1997).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Richard A. Bryant & Allison G. Harvey, The Influence of Litigation on Maintenance of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 3 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 191 (2003).
46. Id. at 191.
47. Id. at 191-92.
48. Id.
49. Eighteen percent versus eight percent. Id. at 192.
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higher percentages of PTSD 50 at two years.5 1 Our recalculations
showed a trend at six months and a significant difference at two years
for litigants to show a more diagnosable psychopathology than the
nonlitigants.
Again, despite Miller's claim, settling the case had no beneficial
psychological effect on these MVA survivors.
C. Our Studies
As explained more fully in this section, our study examined the dif-
ferences between MVA survivors based on the variable of litigation.
As we found, litigants and nonlitigants differ on many features, such
as their level of PTSD, their overall improvement, and their ability to
return to work.
The initial assessment study indicated that of 132 MVA survivors,
eighteen settled litigation in the first year of follow up, forty-nine initi-
ated litigation but had not settled, and sixty-five had never initiated
litigation. 52 The study revealed no significant differences among these
three groups on age, gender, or the distribution of initial diagnoses. 53
There was a significant difference in the extent of the initial injury as
measured by the abbreviated injury scale; follow-up tests showed that
the group who had settled within the first year was more severely in-
jured than the other two groups.54 There was also a significant differ-
ence between the nonlitigants who had less PTSD symptoms, and the
two litigant groups who did not differ. It is of note that the presence
of PTSD in a quarter of the nonlitigants showed it was not the primary
determinant if someone became a litigant.
Over a one-year period, all groups showed a drop in PTSD symp-
toms, showing that even those with pending suits became less sympto-
matic over time. The groups with pending suits had the highest CAPS
score,55 the settled group had a lower score, and the nonlitigant group
had the lowest scores at initial, six-month, and twelve-month assess-
ments. Research suggested the groups with pending suits were signifi-
cantly more depressed than the nonlitigant group, with the settled
litigant group intermediate and not significantly different than the
other two groups. Those with suits still pending were less likely to
50. Twenty-seven percent versus eight percent. Id. at 192 tbl.1.
51. Thirty percent versus zero percent. Bryant & Harvey, supra note 45, at 192 tbl.1.
52. Edward B. Blanchard et al., Effects of Litigation Settlements on Posttraumatic Stress Symp-
toms in Motor Vehicle Accident Victims, 11 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 337 (1998).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. CAPS score is the sum of the symptom frequency (0-4) and symptom severity (0-4) for
the seventeen symptoms of PTSD. The total score is a very sensitive indicator of clinical status.
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return to work. 56 The study showed, however, that those with suits
still pending experienced more distress than those who settled; the dif-
ferences were not significant and were consistent in general with find-
ings since Miller's 1961 assertion.57 Further, of the people who had
been employed fulltime at the time of their accident, we found eighty-
three percent with suits still pending were back at work full time
(sixty-seven percent) or part time (sixteen percent)-clearly contra-
dicting Miller's notion that people did not return to work until after
the suit settled. 58 We further found that 100 percent of those who had
settled were back to work.59
Our earlier study showed that ongoing litigation was a strong pre-
dictor of PTSD at one year.60 We saw this as important, but cautioned
viewing it as a causal variable since a correlation shows a relationship
whose direction is not known. It could be that people who are in-
volved in lawsuits are inclined to make themselves look more sympto-
matic, or it is quite possible that people who are seriously injured and
distressed are more likely to seek the services of lawyers. Our data is
supportive of this latter view, but as we discuss below, we rarely stop
with just preliminary data when faced with such an interesting
question.
IV. MALINGERING AND SYMPTOM EXAGGERATION
One concern that arises in research, forensic evaluations, and
clinical practice is the veracity of symptoms presented. Because of the
nature of personal injury law, sometimes the question becomes
whether a person is exaggerating his or her symptoms or even faking
those symptoms in an effort to realize financial gain. Excellent re-
views on the detection of malingering can be found in the work of
Resnick 61 or Rogers.62
56. See Blanchard et al., supra note 52.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 351-52.
59. Id. at 351.
60. Other factors included fear of dying, prior history of depression, and extent of injury. See
Blanchard et al., supra note 12.
61. Phillip J. Resnick, Malingering of Posttraumatic Stress Disorders, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT
OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION 130 (Richard Rogers ed., 2d ed. 1997).
62. See CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 61; Richard
Rogers & Robert Wettstein, Drug-Assisted Interviews to Detect Malingering and Deception, in
CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 61, at 239 Richard Rog-
ers, Current Status of Clinical Methods, in CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEP-
TION, supra note 61, at 373; Richard Rogers, Researching Dissimulation, in CLINICAL
ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION, supra note 61, at 398 [hereinafter Rogers, Re-
searching Dissimulation].
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As seen in the available data, however, and unlike Miller's assertion
that potential and realized compensation is a large contributant to
one's presentation of symptoms, the data shows compensation makes
little difference in continuation or cessation of symptoms or a person's
return to work. 63 Due to its link to a causal factor and subsequent
psychological distress, PTSD has increasingly become a diagnosis with
the potential for legal recourse and financial compensation. This has
led to a growing concern about whether an individual may be exagger-
ating or even faking his or her disorder. With psychological disorders,
we are often required to base our diagnoses on the history and
description of symptoms given to us by a patient. There are not x-
rays, CAT scans, or other medical tests that can definitively diagnose
these conditions. Even our uses of psychological testing and
psychophysiological assessment have been found problematic. All
carry risks and problems about their sensitivity and their ability to
discriminate true cases from simulated efforts.
Some recent articles have even warned about the coaching of psy-
chological symptoms that can take place prior to an evaluation. 64
Some have argued that with the availability of information today, it is
nearly impossible to have a truly naive individual show up for an eval-
uation without any ideas of what possible symptoms are probed, and
even ways that are used to detect malingering. A recent article even
reported on lawyers coaching clients to fake symptoms prior to a psy-
chological evaluation. 65
A. Our Studies
The Albany MVA Project saw our setting as a unique opportunity
to explore some of the concerns of MVA victims involved in personal
injury lawsuits. Because we had a steady stream of potential research
participants evaluated for entry into a number of studies, we had a
great opportunity to examine comparison groups with "true" or real
victims.
In the first study, 66 we obtained a sample of people who had been in
MVAs but did not develop PTSD or any other symptom and coached
those people in PTSD. We then gained a sample of real world people
63. See supra notes 26, 29, 31, and 35.
64. See Rogers, Researching Dissimulation, supra note 62.
65. James R. Youngjohn, Confirmed Attorney Coaching Prior to Neuropsychological Evalua-
tion, 2 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 279 (1995).
66. See Edward J. Hickling et al., Simulation of Motor Vehicle Accident-Related PTSD: Effects
of Coaching with DSM-IV Criteria, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ROAD TRAFFIC Acci-
DENTS & PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMA: CURRENT UNDERSTANDING, TREATMENT AND LAW 305,
309 (Edward J. Hickling & Edward B. Blanchard eds., 1999).
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who had not been in a recent MVA and coached those people. We
controlled the amount of information each of these groups received
(coached or uncoached-nafve), and then looked at how they did on a
number of standard psychological measures as compared with victims
of "true" PTSD (individuals we had no reason to suspect had malin-
gered or facetious symptoms). We had 130 subjects overall. Simula-
tors were able, at first glance, to look fairly similar to true cases of
PTSD on measures of PTSD symptoms. To summarize a complicated
analysis, we did a discriminative analysis where we looked at patterns
of scores between the groups to see if we could combine the scores of
the tests in a meaningful way to see if we could determine who was
who. We found that trained simulators tended to have higher scores
on depression and one of the PTSD scores than true PTSD patients,
and had lower scores on the measure of anxiety than true PTSD pa-
tients. The results allowed us to correctly classify seventy-six percent
of individuals in our study. Thus, it looks like you can train people to
simulate symptoms of PTSD. If you look at the test scores, however,
there is often a discernable pattern of scores that would help you find
the simulators.
Given our preliminary success in detecting group differences be-
tween trained and untrained simulators of PTSD, and those with true
cases of PTSD, we again looked at the unique setting under which we
worked. Experts in the area of forensic evaluations have historically
suggested that experiments should use highly trained individuals as
simulators who could present to different clinicians a standardized
presentation of a feigned disorder. We adopted and applied that
model ourselves.
When thinking about the best "fakers" available, one does not gen-
erally consider introductory psychology undergraduates who are used'
in many of the simulator studies (mainly because they are available).
And the people who are trying to catch simulators are often poorly
trained graduate students, not representative of the real world with its
experienced clinicians.
Our clinic has very well-trained, advanced students who are closely
supervised, and questions of veracity, though rare, are entertained
regularly as each case is presented and assigned to a study group.
These were the people we wanted to see if we could fool. To fool them
we wanted to get the best fakers possible. Obviously, one major flaw
is that the real malingerers in life, especially the ones who are good at
it, are rarely caught, and are not interested in being part of a psycho-
logical study. So, the next best group we could think of was another
type of professional-professional actors.
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For this study67 we trained six professional actors and actresses in
the DSM-IV criteria for PTSD and major depression. They were not
provided any specific information about tests, but scenarios that
would be used as part of their intake to the clinic were developed, and
the actors were instructed with a method acting coach present for
assistance.
Actors covertly enrolled in our study over a four-month period of
time, with only one of the researchers (EJH), along with the clinic
secretary, knowing their identities. Following the assessment, if the
evaluators found the actors met criteria for entry into a treatment
study, the evaluators randomly assigned the actors to a true, ongoing
treatment condition, and gave them the name of a treating psycholo-
gist (someone in the community who was part of another study).
Once the actors had completed their role in the study, the six evalu-
ators were told of an ongoing deception. Rather than just reveal the
names of the actors, however, the evaluators were then requested to
guess who they thought might have been a simulator among the cases
they had seen over the past six months. They were not told how many
simulators they might have seen, but each was told they had seen at
least one. They were requested to collect all of the charts of the peo-
ple they had seen, to review them, and to guess who they thought
were the simulators. This was done to see how well they could guess if
given all the available information (i.e., psychological tests,
psychophysiological assessment data, structured interview records,
and their notes). These six evaluators did twenty-three evaluations
over the six-months test period.
The premise was very simple: could a group of ostensibly well-
trained evaluators catch a group of the ostensibly best-trained simula-
tors? None of the simulators were detected in the routine initial eval-
uation. When given access to all of the information, the overall hit
rate correctly identifying those who had PTSD, and those who faked,
was ninety-one percent. When other trained evaluators had access to
the information, but lacked the actual participation in the interview,
the correct rate of identification dropped to seventy percent. The con-
clusion was that well-trained interviewers could do a very nice job
picking out the best fakers we could find. But, as a caveat, before the
suspicion was raised, all of the subjects were successfully entered into
our treatment studies having been diagnosed as having PTSD. None
of the subjects during our weekly clinical meetings where we discuss
67. Edward J. Hickling et al., Detection of Malingered MVA Related Posttraumatic Stress Dis-
order: An Investigation of the Ability to Detect Professional Actors by Experienced Clinicians,
Psychological Tests and Psychological Assessment, 2 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 33 (2002).
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new participants were identified by the assessors to have raised any
concern or suspicion about their veracity. The findings of the study
support that the interview, with good reason it appears, remains the
gold standard for diagnostic evaluations when done by skilled
clinicians.
V. SECONDARY TRAUMATIZATION
Before addressing the issue of clinical impressions, this section
briefly touches on the role of retraumatization. In this area we have
no systematic data, but a great deal of experience.
Several prominent researchers have noted that the very process of
litigation can result in retrumatization. 68 We believed that such a pro-
cess accounted for some of the trends we found in data that suggested
that people engaged in ongoing litigation were doing less well psycho-
logically. This phenomenon is certainly found in clinical practice, as
elaborated below.
Several scholars have pointed out how litigation may have an im-
pact that perpetuates or exacerbates psychological distress. 69 Pitman
and his colleagues, in fact, have suggested that the very act of litiga-
tion may affect PTSD symptoms by a process they termed "retrauma-
tization. ' '70 They stated that the need to confront the traumatic
history through interviews with attorneys, depositions, and courtroom
testimony thwarts the victim's characteristic efforts at avoidance. This
predictably results in the resurgence of intrusive ideation and in-
creased arousal. 71 Further, this is done in an adversarial system that
pits the plaintiff against the defendant, who through the occurrence of
the traumatic event may already be seen as the enemy. Patients as
participants in this process may come to see that even though they see
68. See, e.g., Michael Napier, The Medical and Legal Trauma of Disasters, 59 MEDICO-LEGAL
J. 157 (1991); Roger K. Pitman et al., Legal Issues in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in TRAU-
MATIC STRESS: THE EFFECTS OF OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCE ON MIND, BODY AND SOCIETY
378, 378-97 (Bessel A. van der Kolk et al. eds., 1996).
69. Napier, supra note 68; Pitman et al., supra note 68.
70. See Pitman et al., supra note 68.
71. Symptoms of PTSD by definition can be worsened (or exhibited) if the patient is exposed
to stimuli that provide memories of his or her trauma. In treatment when this is done, it is
important to spend sufficient time with the patient to make sure the level of provoked memory
does not cause an overall increase in his or her anxiety. This presentation of provocative memo-
ries is most often accomplished by exposure treatments that require time to discuss the reaction,
cognitive techniques to address the cognitive precipitants and distortions, relaxation techniques
to quiet the physical arousal, and desensitization (over time) so that the response can lessen. In
a courtroom or deposition situation where the questions can provoke the anxious or adverse
response, but where there is no time or intent to lessen the reaction, the process can potentially
increase the strength of the reaction (e.g., intrusive ideation and increased arousal) in the patient
to the stimuli. Id. at 382.
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themselves as the victims, they are now the ones placed on trial, exac-
erbating their sense of vulnerability and victimization.
In addition, the MVA survivor may already have suffered a major
loss financially as a result of the traumatic event; the pursuit of litiga-
tion necessitates additional financial risk and anxiety, as the outcome
is not assured. The Pitman team found that accident victims are often
seeking understanding and justice more than financial gain.72
VI. THE MYTH OF JUSTICE VERSUS THE LEGAL SYSTEM
We agree with most of Pitman's group's opinion. In our experience
at the Center for Stress and Anxiety Disorders, with the Albany MVA
Project, and in clinical practice, the majority of individuals speak of
being wronged, and wanting to get some type of justice for the wrong
that they had to suffer (through no fault of their own). They often
wish they could speak to the other person to hear an apology or some
acknowledgment of responsibility and understanding of the accident's
impact on the victim's life. Often, at the advice of the attorney, there
is no face-to-face confrontation after the MVA until the deposition.
How we think of any event-the trauma, the process of litigation,
or the suffering taking place-is central to the psychological reaction
in people. For many people, the MVA leads to their first real experi-
ence with the legal system. In a psychologist's office they often speak
of how they think things will occur, and what they believe should hap-
pen. One caution they are given is that while it is great if justice truly
occurs, more often they will experience the process of law-people
conducting themselves according to a set of pre-established rules that
are not always understandable to the nonlegal observer.
The awarding of compensation, if smaller than felt fair, is under-
standably likely to create a feeling of injustice. We have seen the
same reaction where a patient was urged by her attorney to accept a
multimillion-dollar settlement in order to adequately provide for a fu-
ture that would likely require continued medical and psychological
services. She complained of not being able to have her day in court.
While she understood the wisdom of the advice, she felt so unresolved
in her anger and her sense of injustice toward the people who were
just buying her off, that a year later she wished she had turned down
that advice and gone to trial. The risk of losing her financial security,
she felt, was not offset by the chance to see the person who crashed
into her punished and forced to admit the "crime" against her.
72. See id.
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VII. ADVERSARIAL AND INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EVALUATIONS
Another issue that we see in New York State, where we have no-
fault automobile insurance laws, is the adversarial role of medical re-
views and independent medical examinations. Here there is a sense
that if the victim does not "prove over and over again" that he or she
is injured and requires these services, the insurance company and its
hired doctors can take away the care that the victim requires. Again,
the person often feels that he or she was not at fault, but is often
viewed as malingering or exaggerating his or her symptoms for the
potential of future compensation. These examinations, besides raising
anger by this perception, increase the anxiety of the patient, and cre-
ate days and weeks of upset that again are viewed as part of the
process.
Lawyers too can add to their own clients' distress. In a psychologi-
cal practice, one may hear how a client depends heavily on the lawyer
representing the patient-being the sole advocate interceding for
medical benefits, lost compensation, and disability benefits. People
are often at a time of great vulnerability, on medications, hurt, and
feeling victimized by a system they do not agree with and do not un-
derstand. When calls are not returned, or they cannot access a lawyer,
this erodes the trust of this vital relationship, which often goes on for
years. Fortunately, the lawyer-client relationship can also be seen as a
positive one, and we have seen lawyers continue professional relation-
ships with clients even after compensation has been awarded. These
relationships can help with financial decisions, medical decisions, and
serve as a support for the client, whose life has been radically changed
by his or her accident. MVA victims are often placed in very unfamil-
iar roles-independent people who now rely on others. They cannot
support themselves. Not getting a disability check can be a life threat-
ening event. They are embarrassed. Their pride and dignity are often
affected by the reaction of others to them, including their lawyer. Per-
haps no better rule than the golden rule is needed, but this rule is one
that our system today often forgets or neglects.
VIII. BETTER, BUT How MUCH BETTER?
As one of the treatment and research centers that had perhaps one
of the better treatment outcomes, it is still critical to understand what
mental health people mean by improvement. PTSD has seventeen
potential symptoms contributing to a diagnosis.7 3 To become "PTSD-
73. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL Dis-
ORDERS 425 (4th ed. 1994).
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free" does not mean you are necessarily symptom free; it means you
do not meet PTSD criteria. Several clusters of symptoms need to be
satisfied. Studies, including our own, can show impressive results
where people are much better, but their lives can still be affected. If
you still have regular nightmares or flashbacks, you could still be tech-
nically free from PTSD, yet have a greatly compromised life. This is
an important qualification because, in this day of managed health
care, we have been very concerned that insurance companies might
believe that our "successful ten-session treatment" means a person is
symptom free. Our fear is that such a misunderstanding could lead
insurance companies to deny requests for additional treatment for
people who still require ongoing mental health care. We offer the
same caution to legal professionals-the quality of a person's life is
not solely understood by the presence, absence, or agreement of a
mental health diagnosis. Accidents can still cause adverse effects yet
not sufficiently merit a DSM-IV diagnosis. And even when there has
not been a diagnosis of PTSD or any mental disorder, traumatic
events often leave some residual impact. Because attorneys are often
close to individuals who are having very powerful memories stirred up
in provocative emotional settings, attorneys can certainly benefit from
sensitivity to the very human reactions that are often found in people
at those times.
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